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Abstract
We study bankruptcy problems under the assumption that claimants have reference-dependent
preferences. We show that in such a context, standard allocative rules are no longer equiv-
alent from the viewpoint of the level of welfare that they generate. A clear ranking of the
most prominent rules actually emerges. Welfare thus becomes an additional dimension that
an arbitrator may want to consider in deciding which allocation to implement. We then
introduce a new rule that always maximizes welfare and discuss its pros and cons.
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JEL classi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1 Introduction
In a bankruptcy problem an arbitrator must allocate a nite and perfectly divisible resource
among several claimants whose claims sum up to a greater amount than what is available. Real
life situations that match this description include the liquidation of a bankrupted rm among
di¤erent creditors, the division of an estate among a number of heirs, or the allocation of time
to the completion of projects assigned by di¤erent clients.
Contact details: ESOMAS Department, University of Torino, Corso Unione Sovietica 218bis, 10134,
Torino, Italy; Collegio Carlo Alberto, Via Real Collegio 30, 10024, Moncalieri, Italy. Email: an-
drea.gallice@carloalberto.org. Telephone: +39 0116705287. Fax: +39 0116705082.
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The formal analysis of bankruptcy problems started with ONeill (1982) and has ourished
since that time (see Moulin, 2002 and Thomson, 2003, 2015 for detailed surveys). The research
question that underlies this rich literature is as follows: how shall the arbitrator adjudicate
conicting claims? The answer usually takes the form of an allocative rule, i.e., a procedure that
processes the data of the problem under scrutiny (namely, the total endowment of the resource
and the individual claims) and then prescribes an allocation for the arbitrator to implement. The
methodology through which a rule is derived can be game-theoretic (see among others Aumann
and Maschler, 1985, Chun and Thomson, 1992, or Dagan and Volij, 1993) or axiomatic (Dagan,
1996, Moulin, 2000, Herrero and Villar, 2001) and di¤erent rules have di¤erent properties or
respond to di¤erent ethical or procedural criteria (see Thomson, 2015, for an inventory of existing
rules and relevant properties).1
A common feature of the literature is that the problem is usually investigated under the (often
implicit) assumption that claimants have linear preferences. Indeed, as Thomson puts it (2015,
p. 57): In the base model, preferences are not explicitly indicated, but it is implicit that each
claimant prefers more of the dividend to less.Thomson continues by saying that the base model
amounts to assuming that the utilities that claimants derive from their assignments are linear,
or to ignoring utilities altogether.2 In this paper we deviate from this tradition and investigate
bankruptcy problems where claimants are endowed with non-linear preferences. In particular,
we focus on a specic family of preferences so-called reference-dependent preferences (RDPs).
Building upon the main insights of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), RDPs
(Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) explicitly acknowledge the fact that an agents perception of a given
outcome is determined not only by the outcome per se but also by how this outcome compares
with a certain reference point. In other words, the agents utility is inuenced by perceived
1Thomson and Yeh, 2008, and Hougaard et al., 2012, further explore the mathematical relationships that hold
between di¤erent rules by introducing the notion of operators, i.e., mappings that associate each rule with
another.
2Papers that take exception to this approach and explicitly study bankruptcy problems in a utility space are
Mariotti and Villar (2005) and Herrero and Villar (2010).
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gains and losses. RDPs thus seem particularly appropriate for use in capturing the preferences
of claimants in bankruptcy problems. These are, in fact, typical situations in which agents form
their own expectations in advance about the allocation that they believe the arbitrator will
implement and then inevitably compare the actual outcome with their expected one.
Indeed, the idea that reference points may play a role in bankruptcy problems is not new.
Chun and Thomson (1992) study a bargaining problem with claims and interpret the disagree-
ment point as a reference point from which agents measure their gains when evaluating a pro-
posal. Herrero (1998) adopts a similar framework but endogenizes the reference point as a
function of the agents claims and the set of feasible allocations. Pulido et al. (2002, 2008)
study bankruptcy problems with reference points in the context of university budgeting pro-
cedures. Finally, Hougaard et al. (2013) consider a more general model of rationing in which
agents have claims as well as baselines, which can also be interpreted as reference points.
However, in line with the previous discussion, all these papers analyze the role of reference
points from a context in which claimants have standard linear preferences. We instead embed
the analysis of reference points into the framework of RDPs. We show that some specic features
of RDPs, such as the diminishing marginal sensitivity to losses, have interesting implications
and lead to novel results. In particular and in sharp contrast to the baseline linear model we
show that when claimants display RDPs, di¤erent allocative rules are no longer equivalent from
the viewpoint of welfare. Indeed, we nd that the three most prominent rules (the proportional
rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal losses rule) can be univocally
ranked according to the level of welfare that they generate.
We then introduce a new rule, which we label the sequential increasing priority (sip) rule.
This rule rst orders the claimants on the basis of their claims, starting from the lowest (ties
are broken randomly), and then assigns to each agent in turn the minimum amount between
his claim and what remains of the endowment. We show that the sip rule always selects an
allocation that maximizes welfare and thus dominates the other rules. More generally, the fact
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that di¤erent rules lead to di¤erent level of welfare implies that welfare emerges as an additional
dimension that an arbitrator may want to consider when choosing how to adjudicate conicting
claims. Indeed, a trade-o¤ between welfare maximization and equity may sometimes emerge,
as the sip rule may fail to satisfy the equal treatment of equals principle. Therefore, an
arbitrator who cares about equity and does not want to discriminate among equals will nd
the sip rule unappealing. In contrast, a more pragmatic arbitrator who aims at maximizing
welfare (or equivalently, at minimizing the aggregate level of disappointment due to perceived
losses) may rmly rely on the sip rule. For instance, this could be the case of a politician
who must allocate limited resources among several lobbyists. In a situation of this kind, the
bottom line of the paper is very clear: if claimants have reference-dependent preferences and
the arbitrator wants to minimize the aggregate level of disappointment, it is better to satisfy
as many claimants as possible (i.e., allocate them an amount that aligns with their claims) and
give maximum disappointment to those claimants who can be disappointed the most, rather
than to slightly disappoint all of the claimants.
2 The model
2.1 A bankruptcy problem
We formally dene a bankruptcy problem by using the standard notation (see, among others,
Dagan and Volij, 1993, Herrero and Villar, 2001, and Thomson, 2003 and 2015). Let E 2 R+
denote the endowment of the resource to be allocated and N = f1; :::; ng be the set of claimants.
Each claimant i 2 N has a claim ci 2 R+ on E, such that the vector c = (c1; :::; cn) collects
individual claims. We dene as a bankruptcy problem (or claims problem) a pair (c; E) 2 RN+R+
where c is such that
P
i ci  E. We denote with  N the class of all such problems. A rule  is
a function that associates to any problem (c; E) 2  N a unique award vector x = (x1 ; :::; xn).
The vector x must satisfy the following basic properties: non-negativity (no claimant is asked
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to pay: xi  0 for any i 2 N); claims boundedness (no claimant receives more than his claim:
xi  ci for any i 2 N); and balance (the entire endowment is distributed:
P
i x

i = E).
The literature on bankruptcy problems has characterized a large number of alternative rules
that respond to di¤erent ethical or procedural criteria (Thomson, 2015). In this paper, we focus
on the three most prominent rules:3
- The proportional rule (prop), which allocates the endowment proportional to the claims:
xpropi = 
propci with
X
i
propci = E (i.e., prop = E=
X
i
ci)
- The constrained equal awards rule (cea), which assigns equal awards to all claimants subject
to the requirement that no one receives more than his claim:
xceai = min fci; ceag with
X
i
min fci; ceag = E
- The constrained equal losses rule (cel), which assigns an equal amount of losses to all claimants
subject to the requirement that no one receives a negative amount:
xceli = max
n
0; ci   cel
o
with
X
i
max
n
0; ci   cel
o
= E
As it has been repeatedly noted (see, for instance, Herrero and Villar, 2001, or Gächter and
Riedl, 2006), all three rules have an egalitarian avor. In particular, the prop rule implements
equality across all claimants in terms of the ratio between awards and claims. The cea rule
aims at implementing the most equal allocation in terms of awards (conditional on compliance
3The prominence of these rules stems from two channels. From a theoretical perspective, these are the unique
rules that simultaneously satisfy the equal treatment of equalsproperty as well as the four basic axioms of scale
invariance, composition, path-independence, and consistency (see Moulin, 2000, or Herrero and Villar, 2001, for
more details). Moreover, these are also the rules that are most commonly used in practice (Gächter and Riedl,
2006).
5
with the claims boundedness property). The cel rule aims at an equal distribution of losses
(conditional on compliance with the non-negativity property).
The following example illustrates the solutions prescribed by these three rules in the context
of a specic bankruptcy problem.
Example 1 Consider the problem (c; E) with c = (0:3; 0:5; 0:8) and E = 1. The three rules
select the following award vectors: xprop = (0:1875; 0:3125; 0:5), xcea = (0:3; 0:35; 0:35), and
xcel = (0:1; 0:3; 0:6).
2.2 Claimantspreferences
Our main departure from the baseline model of a bankruptcy problem consists in explicitly
modeling the claimantspreferences. In particular, we deviate from the (often implicit) assump-
tion that claimants have linear preferences (see Thomson, 2015). Instead, we postulate that
claimants display reference-dependent preferences. As discussed in the Introduction, this family
of preferences seems particularly apt within the context of bankruptcy problems. Indeed, these
are tipical situations in which an agents perception of the nal outcome (i.e., the award that
the agent obtains from the arbitrator) depends not only on the outcome per se but also on how
this outcome compares with the reference level that the agent previously had in mind.
More formally, and in line with the inuential formulation proposed by Koszegi and Rabin
(2006), we endow claimants with the following utility function:
ui(xi j ci) = xi + (xi   ci)
The utility that the agent enjoys from the possession/consumption of what he obtains from the
arbitrator is thus still linear, as it is usually assumed to be in the baseline model. However,
the agents overall utility is now also inuenced by the universal gain-loss function() which
captures the additional e¤ects that perceived gains or losses with respect to the agents reference
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point have on the agents utility. In particular, we postulate that an agents reference point is
given by his claim ci. In other words, ci can be interpreted as an expression of the agents rights,
needs, demands, or aspirations (Mariotti and Villar, 2005).
The function () is assumed to satisfy the following properties:
P1: (z) is continuous for all z, strictly increasing and such that (0) = 0.
P2: (z) is twice di¤erentiable for z 6= 0.
P3: 00(z) > 0 if z < 0 and 00(z) < 0 if z > 0.
P4: if y > z > 0 then (y) + ( y) < (z) + ( z).
P5: limz!0  0(z)= limz!0+ 0(z)   > 1.
The () function thus displays a kink when z = 0, i.e., when the award xi matches the claim
ci. Property P3 then indicates that () is convex for values of xi that are below ci (domain of
losses) and concave for values of xi that are above ci (domain of gains). The same property also
implies that the marginal inuence of these perceived gains and losses is decreasing. Property
P4 means that, for large absolute values of z, the function () is more sensitive to losses than
to gains. P5 implies the same result for small values of z: () is steeper when approaching
the reference point from the left (losses) than when approaching from the right (gains). Taken
together, these last two properties capture the loss aversion phenomenon, namely the fact that
losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
2.3 Social welfare
We are interested in studying how di¤erent allocative rules perform from a social welfare point
of view. As a measure of welfare, we rely on the notion of utilitarian welfare, which is the
most widely used of the welfarist approaches (for a discussion of the pros and cons of such an
approach, see Gravel and Moyes, 2013). Utilitarian welfare simply amounts to the linear sum of
individual utilities. The award vector x thus generates welfare W (x) =
P
i ui (xi).
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Since in our context claimants are endowed with RDPs, welfare takes the following form:
W (x) =
X
i
(xi + (xi   ci)) = E +
X
i
(xi   ci) (1)
where the condition
P
i xi = E follows directly from the fact that any allocation is required
to satisfy the balance property (see Section 2.1). Expression 1 immediately shows that welfare
depends on the specic allocation x = (x1; :::; xn) implemented by the arbitrator. As such,
aggregate welfare is no longer constant across rules. This is in sharp contrast with the baseline
model, where claimants are assumed to have linear preferences.4
The following proposition ranks the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule,
and the constrained equal losses rule on the basis of the aggregate level of welfare that each
rule generates. The ranking emerges because the rules di¤er on how they allocate aggregate
loss L =
P
i ci   E across claimants. Since the () function is strictly convex in the domain of
losses, these di¤erences lead to di¤erences in the level of welfare.
Proposition 1 Consider a bankruptcy problem (c; E) and let claimants have RDPs. The fol-
lowing ranking then holds:
A - W (xcea) = W (xprop) = W (xcel) whenever ci = cj for all i; j 2 N .
B - W (xcea) > W (xprop) > W (xcel) whenever ci 6= cj for some i; j 2 N .
Proof. In the appendix.
The following example illustrates the results of Proposition 1 in the context of a specic
bankruptcy problem.
Example 2 Consider the bankruptcy problem (c; E) with c = (0:6; 0:9) and E = 1 and let
claimantsutility functions be given by:
4Clearly, if ui(xi) = xi for every i 2 N then W (x) =Pi xi = E no matter which specic rule the arbitrator
adopts.
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ui(xi j ci) =
8><>:
xi +
(xi ci)0:88
0:88 if xi  ci
xi   2:25 jxi cij
0:88
0:88 if xi < ci
for i 2 f1; 2g.5
The utilitarian social welfare function is thus given by
W (x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1  2:25 jx1 0:6j0:880:88 + (1 x1 0:9)
0:88
0:88 if x1 2 [0; 0:1]
1  2:25 jx1 0:6j0:880:88   2:25 j1 x1 0:9j
0:88
0:88 if x1 2 (0:1; 0:6)
1 + (x1 0:6)
0:88
0:88   2:25 j1 x1 0:9j
0:88
0:88 if x1 2 [0:6; 1]
Since xprop = (0:4; 0:6), xcea = (0:5; 0:5), and xcel = (0:35; 0:65), it follows that W (xprop) =
 0:507, W (xcea) =  0:479, and W (xcel) =  0:510. Coherently with Proposition 1, the ranking
W (xcea) > W (xprop) > W (xcel) thus holds. Figure 1 below illustrates the claimants utility
functions while Figure 2 depicts the social welfare function W (x).
Figure 1. Claimantsutility functions.6 Figure 2. The utilitarian social welfare function.
5Claimants thus display the so called power gain-loss () function (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), whose
general form is given by:
(z) =
(
z1 
1  if z  0
  jzj1 
1  if z < 0
and the parameters  2 [0; 1) and  > 1 determine the degree of diminishing sensitivity and the degree of loss
aversion, respectively. In line with experimental evidence, and following Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we set
 = 0:12 and  = 2:25.
6Notice that in the gure u1(x1 j c1) goes from left to right whereas u2(x2 j c2) with x2 = 1   x1 goes from
right to left.
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2.4 The sequential increasing priority rule
Proposition 1 ranks the three most prominent rules according to the level of utilitarian welfare
that each rule generates. However, the proposition remains silent on the subject of how these
solutions compare with the rst-best solution, i.e., a solution that maximizes welfare. In this
respect, Example 2 (see in particular Figure 2) suggests that the three rules do not necessarily
select award vectors that maximize welfare. The intuition is that, in the context of RDPs,
these rules fail to properly take into account the diminishing sensitivity to losses shown by the
() function. This property implies that, from a utilitarian point of view, it is more e¢ cient
to satisfy only some of the agents (i.e., allocate them an award that equals their claims) and
greatly disappoint the remaining ones rather than to slightly disappoint all of the agents.
We now introduce a new rule that always selects an award vector that maximizes utilitarian
welfare. We label it sequential increasing priority rule.
- The sequential increasing priority (sip) rule rst orders the claimants on the basis of their
claims, starting from the lowest (i.e., c1  c2  :::  cn; any ties are broken randomly), and
then assigns to each agent in turn the minimum amount between his claim and what remains of
the endowment:
xsipi = min
n
ci;max
n
E  
X
j<i
cj ; 0
oo
:
By construction, the sip rule thus selects an allocation that matches the claims of as many
claimants as possible and disappoints the remaining claimants at the maximum level.7 Put
di¤erently, the sip rule selects the award vector that causes the greatest unhappiness to the least
7 In the context of Example 1, the sip rule selects the allocation xsip = (0:3; 0:5; 0:2) and thus attributes the
entire aggregate loss of 0:6 to agent 3. In the context of Example 2, the sip rule selects xsip = (0:6; 0:4) and
thus attributes the entire loss to agent 2. More generally, the sip rule qualies as a specic case of the family of
sequential priority rules (see Moulin, 2000, or Thomson, 2015).
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number of claimants. The rule thus implements the same principle that Bossert and Suzumura
(2016) characterize in a framework of ordinally measurable and interpersonally non-comparable
utilities.
The following proposition shows that the sip rule achieves maximal welfare.
Proposition 2 The sip rule selects an award vector that maximizes utilitarian welfare.
Proof. In the appendix.
Three comments are in order here. First, the claim that the sip rule achieves maximal welfare
holds within the domain of all those allocations that satisfy the claims boundedness property,
i.e., all allocations such that xi  ci for all i 2 N .8 Second, the fact that xsip maximizes
utilitarian welfare is equivalent to saying that xsip minimizes
P
i (xi   ci) (see Expression 1).
In other words, the sip rule allocates the aggregate loss in a way that minimizes the aggregate
level of disappointment stemming from agentsperceived losses. Third, the award vector xsip
may not be the sole welfare maximizing allocation.9 However, whenever multiple solutions
exist, the sip rule will always select the award vector that is characterized by the lowest level
of inequality. Therefore, an arbitrator with lexicographic preferences dened over utilitarian
welfare and equality will prefer the allocation xsip over any other allocation. The following
example illustrates this point.
8The existence of an allocation x with xi > ci for some i 2 N and such that W (x) > W (xsip) depends on
the specic shape of the agentsutility functions. In particular, x exists if and only if the decrease in aggregate
welfare associated with further disappointing the residual claimant ~{ by allocating him xsip~{    is more than
compensated by the increase stemming from redistributing the amount  among the claimants i = f1; :::;~{  1g.
More formally, x exists if and only if (~{  1)


~{ 1

>

(xsip~{   c~{)  (xsip~{     c~{)

.
9Let c1 < c2 < ::: < cn. The number of welfare maximizing allocations is then given by
 ~Nk where ~Nk is the
rst non-empty set Nk = fi 2 N : ci  Lkg n fi 2 Ngni=n k+1 with k 2 f0; :::; n  1g, Lk = L 
Pn
n k+1 ci is the
residual loss, and L =
P
i ci E is the aggregate loss. Clearly, the number of solutions may further increase when
some of the claimants are symmetric. Notice also that when there are only two claimants and max fc1; c2g  E
then there always exist two solutions since the condition ci  L holds for any i 2 f1; 2g (see Figure 2 in Example
2 for a graphical illustration of such a situation).
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Example 3 Consider a bankruptcy problem (c; 1) with 4 claimants and c = (0:1; 0:2; 0:5; 0:6).
The sip rule selects the allocation xsip = (0:1; 0:2; 0:5; 0:2) with W (xsip) = 1+( 0:4). The allo-
cation x0 = (0:1; 0:2; 0:1; 0:6) generates the same level of welfare, W (x0) = 1+( 0:4). However,
xsip implements a less unequal distribution: the Gini index of xsip amounts to G(xsip) = 0:3
whereas x0 is such that G(x0) = 0:4.
Combining the results of propositions 1 and 2, we can thus present a complete ranking of
the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, and
the sequential increasing priority rule.
Proposition 3 Consider a bankruptcy problem (c; E) and let claimants have RDPs. The fol-
lowing ranking then holds:
A - W (xsip) > W (x ) for any  2 fprop; cea; celg whenever ci = cj for all i; j 2 N .
B - W (xsip) W (xcea) > W (xprop) > W (xcel) whenever ci 6= cj for some i; j 2 N .
Proof. In the appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the sip rule (weakly) dominates all other rules from the point of
view of utilitarian welfare. On the other hand, it is important to notice that the sip rule may fail
to satisfy the equal treatment of equalsprinciple, which states that agents with identical claims
should be treated identically.10 The equal treatment of equalsprinciple is often regarded as a
basic ethical property that an allocative rule should satisfy.11 Therefore an arbitrator may face
a trade-o¤ between welfare maximization and equity.12 In this respect, the sip rule does not
10This is evident in the case where all claimants are symmetric. Indeed, if ci = cj for all i; j 2 N , then
x =
 
E
n
; :::; E
n

for any  2 fprop; cea; celg, whereas xsip =

ci; ci; :::; E  Pj<i cj ; 0; :::; 0.
11Concerning the four basic invariance axioms (Moulin, 2000, Herrero and Villar, 2001), it is immediate to
verify that the sip rule satises the scale invariance axiom, the composition axiom, and the consistency axiom
but fails to satisfy the path-independence axiom.
12Notice that in some circumstances the sip rule does satisfy the equal treatment of equals property. Say
that c = (0:3; 0:3; 0:3; 0:4) and E = 1; then, xsip = (0:3; 0:3; 0:3; 0:1) such that claimants 1, 2, and 3 are treated
identically.
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appear to be palatable for an arbitrator who wants to be impartial and and give symmetrical
treatment to agents with the same claims.
However, there are situations in which the arbitrator should indeed discriminate across
agents, even though their claims are symmetric (see Moulin, 2000). In these circumstances,
the sip rule seems appropriate to guide the choice of a pragmatic arbitrator who wants to
minimize the aggregate level of disappointment (i.e., the total impact that perceived losses have
on welfare) across claimants. For instance, consider the case of a politician who must distribute
a scarce resource (say, public funds) across several claimants (say, di¤erent associations). As-
sume moreover that the probability that these associations will support the politician in the next
election decreases with their level of disappointment. Our analysis shows that in such a context
it is wiser for the politician to fully satisfy the requests of as many associations as possible and
disappoint the remaining associations at the maximum level rather than to partially disappoint
all of them. Similarly, consider the situation of an agent who must allocate a limited amount
of time to the completion of several tasks required by di¤erent principals. Our analysis again
suggests that instead of partially progressing in the completion of every task, it is better for the
agent to fully complete as many tasks as possible while totally ignoring the rest.
3 Conclusions
We studied bankruptcy problems under the assumption that claimants display reference-dependent
preferences and thus do not only care about the award that they get but also about how this
award compares with their initial claims. Contrary to the baseline model with linear utilities, we
showed that in such a context, standard rules are no longer equivalent from the viewpoint of wel-
fare. Welfare thus emerges as an additional dimension that an arbitrator may want to consider in
choosing which rule to adopt. In this respect, we provided a complete ranking of the three most
prominent rules (the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained
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equal losses rule) based on the level of welfare that they generate. We then introduced a new
rule (the sequential increasing priority rule) that always achieves maximal welfare. However, we
also discussed some potential drawbacks of the sequential increasing priority rule and showed
that in some circumstances a trade-o¤ between welfare maximization and the equal treatment
of symmetric claimants may emerge. As such, we claimed that the sequential increasing priority
rule appears to be appropriate for solving bankruptcy problems in which the arbitrator wants
to minimize claimantsaggregate level of disappointment, and thereby minimize the number of
complaints or the severity of the retaliation that he may face.
4 Appendix: Proofs of the propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Case A: By construction, all three rules satisfy the equal treatment of equalsprinciple. There-
fore, x =
 
E
n ; :::;
E
n

for any  2 fprop; cea; celg whenever ci = cj for all i; j 2 N . It then follows
that W (xprop) = W (xcea) = W (xcel).
Case B: The allocation x with  2 fprop; cea; celg generates utilitarian welfare W (x ) =
E +
P
i (l

i ) where l

i = (x

i   ci) is the individual loss that agent i su¤ers in x . Clearly,
li  0 for all i and all  given that all rules select an award vector that satises the claims
boundedness property (xi  ci for all i 2 N). Because of the balance property (
P
i x

i = E),
aggregate loss can thus be expressed as L =
P
i l

i =
P
i(x

i   ci) = E  
P
i ci and thus does
not depend on  . Therefore, the three rules only di¤er in how they allocate L across claimants.
Let l = (l1 ; :::; l

n) and consider rst the cel rule. By construction, the cel rule allocates L as
equally as possible. As such, the rule selects the allocation that minimizes 2(l), the variance of
the elements of l.13 More formally, 2(lcel) < 2(l0) for any l0 = (l01; :::; l0n) such that
P
i l
0
i = L
13 In particular, 2(lcel) = 0 whenever the condition ci 
 P
i ci   1

=n for any i holds, since in such a case
the cel rule assigns the same individual loss lceli =
L
n
to every i. In contrast, 2(lcel) > 0 whenever the condition
ci <
 P
i ci   1

=n for some i holds since in this case an egalitarian allocation of L is not feasible.
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and l0i 6= l0j for some i; j 2 N . The strict convexity of the () function in the domain of losses
then implies that
P
i 
 
lceli

<
P
i (l
0
i) < 0. Since x
cel 6= x with  2 fprop; ceag whenever
ci 6= cj for some i; j 2 N , it follows that lcel 6= l with  2 fprop; ceag and thus it must be the
case that min

2(lprop); 2(lcea)
	
> 2(lcel). Therefore, min fW (xprop);W (xcea)g > W (xcel).
Now compare the cea and the prop rule. Assume rst that the condition ci > En for all i
holds. The cea rule then selects the egalitarian allocation xcea =
 
E
n ; :::;
E
n

. Therefore, lcea
is such that lceai =
E
n   ci for all i. It follows that 2(lcea) = 2(c). The prop rule instead
selects the allocation xpropi = 
propci with prop = E=
P
i ci such that 
prop 2 (0; 1). Therefore,
lpropi = (
prop   1) ci for all i. It follows that 2(lprop) = (prop   1)22(c). This implies that
2(lcea) > 2(lprop) given that (prop   1)2 < 1. If on the other hand, the condition ci  En for
some i holds then lcea is such that lceai = 0 for some i. It follows that 
2(lcea) > 2(c) and the
condition 2(lcea) > 2(lprop) thus holds a fortiori. In other words, the proportional rule leads
to an allocation of individual losses that displays a lower variance with respect to the allocation
that stems from applying the constrained equal awards rule. Because of the strict convexity of
the () function, it then follows that W (xcea) > W (xprop). We can thus complete the ranking
and state that W (xcea) > W (xprop) > W (xcel). 
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the problem maxxW = E+
P
i (xi  ci). A solution certainly exists given that W ()
is continuous in the closed and bounded space dened by the conditions xi 2 R+ for all i 2 N
and
P
i xi = E, and thus the Weierstrass theorem applies. Any allocation x that satises the
claims boundedness property is such that xi  ci for all claimants. Given that
P
i ci > E, it
must then be the case that xi < ci for m claimants with m 2 f1; :::; ng. The function W ()
is thus given by the sum of a constant and m strictly convex functions since 00(z) > 0 when
z < 0. Therefore, W () is strictly convex and the function reaches a maximum as a corner
solution (i.e., at a point in which xi = ci for some i 2 N). The diminishing marginal sensitivity
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of the () function implies j(0) + (a+ b)j < j(a) + (b)j for any a; b < 0. Therefore, the
allocations that maximize utilitarian welfare are those that assign xi = ci to as many agents as
possible and disappoint as much as possible the claimants that can be disappointed the most.
By construction, the sequential increasing priority rule selects such an allocation. 
Proof of Proposition 3
It is immediate to show that, whenever ci = cj for all i; j 2 N , the strict ranking W (xsip) >
W (x ) for any  2 fprop; cea; celg holds. Indeed, because of the properties of the  () function,
W (xsip) > W (xprop) since xprop is such that xpropi   ci < 0 for all i 2 N . Moreover, because
of Proposition 1, we know that if ci = cj for all i; j 2 N then W (xprop) = W (xcea) = W (xcel).
It then follows that W (xsip) > W (x ) for any  2 fprop; cea; celg. Concerning case B, the
condition W (xsip) = W (xcea) only holds if there exist n   1 claimants with ci < En and one
claimant j with cj > E  
P
i 6=j ci. Indeed, it is easy to verify that in such a situation x
sip and
xcea coincide (in particular, xsipi = x
cea
i = ci for all i and x
sip
j = x
cea
j = E 
P
i 6=j ci). In all other
cases, the strict ordering W (xsip) > W (xcea) holds. 
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